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Campbell v. Campbell: 
An Examination of the Original 
and Revised Theories of Surge 
and Decline 
Joseph Gershtenso n 
East Carolina University 
One of the most consistent patterns in American politics 
is the loss of congressional seats suffered by the presi-
dent's party in midterm elections . This phenomenon can 
have important , even profound, implications for the op-
eration of American government. Unsurprisingly, then, 
considerable scholarly attention has been devoted to ex-
plaining midterm decline . This research examines two of 
the competing theories, the "original" and "revised" 
theories of surge and decline proposed by Angus and 
James Campbell, respectively. I outline hypotheses fol-
lowing from each theory and subject them to a series of 
empirical tests using data from the American National 
Election Studies ' (NES) panel surveys of 1956-60, 1972-
76, and 1992-94. My findings generally favor the origi-
nal version of the theory. 
0 ne of the most consistent patterns in American politics is the loss of congressional seats suffered by the president's party in midterm elections . With the exceptions of 1934 
and 1998, the number of seats in the House of Representatives 
held by members of the presidential party has decreased in every 
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midterm contest since 1862. 1 In 1994, the losses suffered by 
President Clinton's Democratic Party led to the first Republican 
majority in the chamber in forty years. The 1994 case illustrates 
the potential implications of the midterm decline phenomenon. 
The Republican majority entered the 104th Congress with much 
of its membership united behind the nationalized campaign mes-
sage of the policy package known as the Contract with America. 
They intended to lead the way in formulating legislation, forcing 
Clinton to react to their agenda. Clearly, relations between the 
legislative and executive branches were likely to become more 
strained, and this indeed did come to pass, with the budget dead-
lock of 1995 representing the peak of the antagonism. 
While the 1994 case demonstrates the profound implications 
for American government that the phenomenon of midterm de-
cline may entail, it should be noted that many instances of off-
year losses have not led to a change in the majority party in the 
House and the introduction of divided government. Nevertheless, 
midterm losses for the president's party will always have poten-
tially important consequences. They can affect inter-branch rela-
tions and presidential legislative success since members of the 
president's party vote in accordance with his desire more than do 
members of the opposition (Aldrich 1995; Fleisher and Bond 
2000). In addition, the composition of congressional committees 
will invariably change in the aftermath of midterm elections due 
to the necessary replacement of departing members. Finally, the 
very existence of the midterm loss pattern may exert influence 
over which individuals choose to run for office in the first place. 
1The 1902 elections also represent an exception to the strict pattern of midterm seat loss. 
In the elections of that year, the Republicans gained 9 seats in the House of Representa-
tives. However, this gain actually represents a relative loss in comparison to the 25 seats 
gained by the Democrats in that year. Increases by both parties were made possible by an 
increase in the total number of seats in the wake of the 1900 census. 
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
CAMPBELL V. CAMPBELL 3 
Because politicians are strategic actors (Jacobson and Kernell 
1983), the party not controlling the presidency may field stronger 
candidates in midterm elections. 
Given the wide range of possible implications of midterm 
losses, it is not surprising that political scientists have devoted 
considerable attention to the phenomenon. Research on midterm 
decline typically involves aggregate analyses attempting to ex-
plain the magnitude of the presidential party's seat change (loss) 
and to forecast outcomes of impending midterm elections. At the 
risk of oversimplification, I group the literature into two major 
categories, coattails and referenda theory. Both emphasize na-
tional-level variables in contrast to the focus on local variables 
such as candidate assessments and campaign spending •found in 
most general analyses of congressional elections ( e.g. 
Abramowitz and Segal 1992; Gronke 2000; Hermson 2000; Ja-
cobson 2001; Krasno 1994). 
Scholars of the coattails tradition point to the influence of 
presidential vote choice on voters' decisions over congressional 
candidates. Because some citizens vote for candidates of their 
preferred presidential candidate's party in other races on the bal-
lot, the president carries some of his fellow partisans into office 
with him. Midterm elections remove the possibility of the presi-
dential coattail effect, and the president's party consequently suf-
fers. The magnitude of their losses will depend on the strength of 
the coattail effect in the preceding presidential election and the 
"exposure" of the party (Born 1990; Campbell 1960; J. Campbell 
1985, 1993, 1997; Gaddie 1997; Hinckley 1967; Oppenheimer, 
Stimson, and Waterman 1986; Waterman, Oppenheimer, and 
Stimson 1991). 
Tufte's (1975) groundbreaking work on the role of economic 
conditions and presidential popularity set the stage for a spate of 
alternative models falling under the heading of referenda theory. 
These models envision public assessments of the president's per-
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formance as the primary determinant of his party's fate in mid-
term elections. Following in Tufte's footsteps, many scholars 
focus on economic indicators, most commonly change in real 
disposable income per capita, as the basis for the referendum 
(Alesina and Rosenthal 1989; Arcelus and Meltzer, 1975; Bloom 
and Price 1975; Erikson 1988; Hibbs 1987; Lewis-Beck and 
Rice 1984, 1992; Rudalevige 2001; Tufte 1975, 1978). As men-
tioned above, Tufte's (1975) model also included presidential 
popularity as an explanatory variable, and several subsequent 
works have expanded on this (Kernell 1977; Lau 1982, 1985). 
Debate about what drives the phenomenon of midterm losses 
remains unresolved. Even within the two more encompassing 
categories, disagreement exists over causal mechanisms and key 
independent variables. Rather than test the relative merits of the 
two broad theoretical perspectives, however, I highlight one of 
the intra-approach debates. Specifically, I examine Angus Camp-
bell's (1960, 1964, 1966) "original" theory of surge and decline 
and the "revised" version offered by James Campbell (1987, 
1993).2 In doing so, my focus is not on explaining and predicting 
midterm losses, but rather on individual-level behavior. 
SURGE AND DECLINE: 
THE ORIGINAL AND REVISED FORMULATIONS 
Original Theory 
Angus Campbell's original formulation of surge and decline 
was an effort to use survey data to provide an individual-level 
explanation for the regularities of lower turnout in midterm elec-
tions and the loss of congressional seats by the president's party. 
2Unless otherwise noted , this paper will use Campbell to refer to Angus Campbell and J. 
Campbell to refer to James Campbell . 
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In Campbell's theory, party identification is dominant in deter-
mining individuals' behavior. An attachment to one or the other 
political party makes it more probable that a citizen will partici-
pate in politics and that she will consistently vote for candidates 
of the same party label. Political interest is also important. Some 
individuals are more engaged in the political arena than others 
and are consequently more likely to be regular participants. 
Party identification and political interest thus establish a base-
line for individual behavior and the phenomenon of surge and 
decline represents deviations from this baseline caused by short-
term political stimuli. These stimuli include policy issues, the 
candidates involved in a particular contest, and other non-
enduring forces. When such stimuli are numerous and powerful, 
the election can be described as a "high-stimulus" election, while 
elections in which short-term forces are weaker are considered 
"low-stimulus." High-stimulus elections generally have higher 
levels of turnout as individuals whose levels of political interest 
and party attachment might not be sufficient to induce participa-
tion in low-stimulus contests are drawn into action. These citi-
zens, who only vote when short-term forces are strong, are the 
"peripheral" voters who constitute the first component of elec-
toral surges. 
Some "core" voters also contribute to electoral surges. Be-
cause they have stronger party ties and more interest in politics, 
these individuals participate in all elections and tend to be loyal 
to their chosen party. Nevertheless, they too are subject to the 
influence of short-term forces. For some core voters these forces 
can be potent enough to overcome their underlying dispositions, 
leading to "defection" from their preferred party in a given elec-
tion. 
It is not sufficient, however, to argue that some elections will 
induce greater participation and defection due to the strength of 
their associated short-term stimuli. To account for the regularities 
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observed, surge and decline theory must make two additional 
claims. First, Campbell proposes that presidential elections in-
volve, by nature, significantly higher levels of stimulus than their 
midterm counterparts. Second, the short-term forces present in 
presidential years will generally favor one party over the other. 
As a result, both the partisan division of the peripheral voters 
participating and the balance of defections by core voters will 
favor that party. The party benefiting is almost invariably that 
with the winning presidential candidate, and that party is there-
fore likely to gain seats in Congress. 
Having outlined the logic of partisan surges in presidential 
years, the decline in midterm elections is quite straightforward. 
The diminished level of stimulation in these years means that 
peripheral voters who had participated in the preceding presiden-
tial contest will now choose to stay home while core voters will 
revert to their underlying preferences. With both elements of the 
surge removed, the presidential party will suffer losses and the 
result should approximate a longer-term equilibrium or "normal 
vote" in which each party receives a proportion of the vote com-
mensurate with the proportion of citizens who identify more 
strongly with that party. 
Campbell's (1966) analysis of electoral decline relies on data 
from a 1956-58 panel study by the Survey Research Center. The 
majority of his findings are supportive of the theory. The short-
term stimuli associated with the presidential campaign of 1956 
did seem to stimulate turnout relatively more for Independents 
than for strong partisans (as shown by the relative shares of these 
two groups respectively in the voting public in 1956 and 1958). 
In addition, the influence of short-term forces on the vote choice 
of peripheral citizens was borne out by the two-to-one margin 
enjoyed by Eisenhower among such voters in 1956. These short-
term forces also appeared to be more powerful for peripheral 
voters than core voters, as evidenced by lower defection rates 
THE J OU RNAL OF POLITI CAL SCIE NCE 
CAMPBELL V. CAMPBELL 7 
among the latter group. Furthermore, defection rates in the presi-
dential contest were quite unequal, with Democrats abandoning 
their candidate far more often than Republicans. Finally, the abil-
ity of short-term forces to alter behavior of core voters was seen 
in the dramatic decline in Democratic defection rates between 
1956 and 1958. 
Although Campbell's theory went essentially unchallenged 
for nearly a decade, it did eventually come under closer scrutiny 
by other scholars. In addition to the emergence of referenda 
models, the propositions of surge and decline themselves were 
increasingly brought into question. The first notable studies 
showed not only that the sociodemographic composition of mid-
term and presidential electorates is almost identical, but that 
these electorates also lack meaningful differences in terms of 
their partisanship (Arseneau and Wolfinger 1973; Wolfinger, 
Rosenstone, and McIntosh 1981; Kernell 1977). There is also 
evidence that defection rates are not necessarily higher in presi-
dential years than in midterm elections (Ornstein et al. 1984). 
Furthermore, core voters may not be more loyal to their identi-
fied party than are peripheral individuals (Cover 1985; Kernell 
1977). The lack of greater fidelity by core voters is also implied 
by aggregate data that show midterm elections to be more vola-
tile than their presidential counterparts (Jacobson and Kernell 
1983). 
Revised Theory 
In response to these findings challenging many of the hy-
potheses proposed by surge and decline, James Campbell (1987, 
1993) formulated a revised version of the theory. Like the origi-
nal version, J. Campbell's theory presumes that higher levels of 
short-term political stimuli associated with presidential elections 
drive the surge and decline phenomenon. Short-term forces favor 
the party winning the presidency, resulting in congressional gains 
VOL . 30 2002 
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for that party. The subsequent midterm election then brings about 
a return to normal turnout and vote choice patterns and losses for 
the party controlling the presidency. 
The primary difference between the original and revised theo-
ries is in the individual-level processes hypothesized to be at 
work.3 J. Campbell proposes that the electoral cycle is a product 
of variations in the vote choice of Independents and the turnout 
of partisans. Presuming that strength of partisan identification is 
positively related to turnout in all elections, J. Campbell claims 
that Independents will not experience disproportionate (relative 
to partisans) increases in turnout under the high stimulus condi-
tions of presidential campaigns. Instead, the contribution of this 
group to surge and decline is the result of their greater support 
for candidates of the winning presidential party in on-year elec-
tions than off-year elections. 
The proposed effect of short-term stimuli on partisans is also 
different. Rather than contributing to the surge by causing some 
proportion of identifiers of the losing presidential candidate's 
party to defect, these stimuli are believed to exert influence via 
turnout effects. Pointing to literature on the effects of cross-
pressures ( e.g. Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944; Zipp 
1985; Southwell 1986), J. Campbell argues that "disadvantaged" 
partisans (i.e. individuals identifying with the party of the losing 
presidential candidate) are more likely to abstain than defect. In 
addition to the withdrawal of disadvantaged partisans, the biased 
short-term stimuli of presidential years create a sense of enthusi-
asm among "advantaged" partisans, thereby augmenting their 
participation. Without powerful stimuli favoring one party over 
3lt should also be noted that J. Campbell's (I 987, 1993) revised theory also entails an 
attempt to merge surge and decline with referenda approaches by including presidential 
popularity and economic conditions in his model for midterm election outcomes . More 
recently (1997), J. Campbell has also incorporated realignment into his model of midterm 
decline . 
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the other, midterm contests lack the strong cross-pressures and 
reinforcing pressures of on-years. Consequently, partisan turnout 
levels more closely approximate the proportion of identifiers in 
the electorate and the presidential party suffers some setbacks. 
In his 1987 piece, J. Campbell examines two testable hy-
potheses that follow from his theory using data from National 
Election Studies covering the seven election pairs from 1956 to 
1982.• He finds that partisan representation in the presidential 
electorate varies directly with the strength of short-term stimuli 
favoring their party (as measured by the actual partisan division 
of the presidential vote) and that the presidential vote division of 
Independents also reflects the strength and direction of short-
term forces. 
In J. Campbell's most complete formulation (1993), he identi-
fies three types of propositions emerging from the original and 
revised theories of surge and decline: national, district, and elec-
torate. The propositions of the two theories are identical across 
the first two categories, and the findings are generally supportive 
of the notion that short-term political stimuli are an important 
determinant of congressional candidates' electoral fortunes. It is 
with regard to the electorate that the two theories diverge. J. 
Campbell lists six propositions derived from the original theory, 
two of which diverge from the expectations of his own model. 
He states those two as follows:i 
'The actual wording of the hypotheses (p. 970) is as follows : 
(I) Partisans should be present in the presidential electorate in direct proportion to the 
magnitude of short-term forces favorable to their party. 
(2) The division of the independent vote in presidential elections should reflect the 
magnitude of short-term forces favoring one party over the other. 
lThe four additional hypotheses are as follows : 
Proposition 5: All things being equal, midterm electorates are older than presidential 
electorates (p . 45). 
Proposition 6: All things being equal, midterm electorates are morehighly educated 
than presidential electorates (p. 45) . 
Note continues on next page . 
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Proposition 8: All things being equal, voters with a 
strong party identification compose a larger segment 
of midterm electorates than of presidential electorates 
(p. 46). 
Proposition 9: Partisan defections from the disadvan-
taged party (i.e., the party losing the presidential 
race) in presidential elections are greater than in mid-
term elections and are proportionate to the short-term 
forces favoring the president's party (p. 48). 
Using a variety of data covering the years 1952-1990, J. 
Campbell finds that neither of these propositions is well sup-
ported . Instead, the evidence seems to favor the revised theory 's 
expectations regarding turnout and vote choice. 
SURGE AND DECLINE: TESTABLE HYPOTHESES 
J. Campbell's most recent analysis (1997) of midterm decline 
examines possible additions to his model to help account for the 
overwhelming losses by Democrats in 1994. Incorporating re-
alignment into the explanation is a significant step. However, the 
work does not address the electorate propositions that differenti-
ate the original and revised surge and decline theories. Perhaps J. 
Campbell views the matter as settled. I revisit the debate for two 
reasons. First, there is a need to outline an explicit list of testable 
propositions derived from each theory. Second, J. Campbell's 
Proposition 7: All things being equal, voters with a deep and sustained interest in poli-
tics compose a larger segment of midterm electorates than of presidential elector-
ates (p.46) . 
Proposition 10: The independent vote for the president's party in presidential elections 
is greater than in midterm elections and is proportionate to the short-term forces fa. 
voring the president 's party .(p .48) . 
J . Campbell argues, and I agree, that propositions 5 and 6 are essentially tangential to the 
validity of the theory. While more central to the original theory, propositions 7 and 10 do 
not conflict with expectations of the revised model. 
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examination (1993) of the competing theories uses different 
types of data than those employed by his predecessor. This study 
addresses both issues in an attempt to more directly compare the 
two theories. I begin by presenting testable hypotheses (which 
can be grouped into those dealing with turnout and those dealing 
with vote choice) for each of the models. 
Turnout 
As noted above, the original and revised theories differ in 
their beliefs about the effect of short-term stimuli on the partici-
pation rates of partisan groups. According to the original theory, 
the lack of partisan attachments among Independents makes 
them less likely to participate, ceteris paribus, and consequently 
relatively more stimulated by presidential elections than their 
party identifier counterparts. This leads to: 
Hypothesis 1 (Hl): The presidential-year electorate 
will have a higher percentage of Independents ( or, at 
least, individuals who are not strong partisans) than 
that of the midterm. 
The hypothesis may also be stated in terms of partisan com-
position of core and peripheral voters: 
Hypothesis IA (HlA): Independents (or, at least, in-
dividuals who are not strong partisans) represent a 
larger share of peripheral voters than they do of core 
voters. 
Meanwhile, the revised theory presumes that Independents 
and partisans are approximately equal in their underlying pro-
pensities to participate in elections and that short-term political 
stimuli affect turnout by creating cross-pressures for disadvan-
taged partisans. Consequently, we have: 
VOL. 30 2002 
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Hypothesis 2 (H2): The proportion of Independents 
in presidential-year and midterm electorates will be 
approximately equal. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Advantaged partisans will com-
pose a larger segment of presidential-year than mid-
term electorates . 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Disadvantaged partisans will 
compose a smaller segment of presidential-year than 
midterm electorates. 
Again, these hypotheses may be rephrased in terms of core 
and peripheral voters: 
Hypothesis 2A (H2A): The proportion of Independ-
ents in the ranks of core and peripheral voters will be 
approximately equal. 
Hypothesis 3A (H3A): Advantaged partisans will 
compose a larger segment of peripheral voters than 
core voters. 
Hypothesis 4A (H4A): Disadvantaged partisans will 
compose a smaller segment of peripheral voters than 
core voters. 
As should be apparent, hypotheses 1 and 2 (IA and 2A) are 
directly contradictory. This is shown in Table 1 by their juxtapo-
sition and also means that the two may be framed as null and 
alternative hypotheses for a single statistical test (see Appendix 
B). In contrast, hypotheses 3 and 4 have no counterparts in the 
original theory. 
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TABLE 1 
Hypotheses of the Original and Revised Theories 
of Surge and Dec1ine 
ORIGINAL THEORY REVISED THEORY 
Turnout 
H 1 I 1 A: Independents greater 
share of: on v. off-year elector-
ates/peripheral v. core voters 
H2/2A : Independents equal 
share of: on and off-year elec-
torates /peripheral and core 
voters 
H3/3A: Advantaged partisans 
greater share of: on v. off-year 
electorates /peripheral v. core 
voters 
H4/4A: Disadvantaged parti-
sans smaller share of: on v. off-
year electorates /peripheral v. 
core voters 
Vote Choice 
H5: Defection rates lower for H8: Defection rates equal for 
core v. eri heral voters core and eri heral voters 
H6: Defection rates in on-years H9: Defection rates equal for 
higher for disadvantaged v. advantaged and disadvantaged 
advanta ed artisans artisans 
H7: Defection rates higher in H 10: Defection rates equal in 
on v. off- ears on and off- ears 
H 11: Higher independent vote for presidential party in on v. off-
years 
H12: Higher vote for presidential party by peripheral v. core vot-
ers 
13 
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Vote Choice 
The two theories also differ in their expectations regarding 
the behavior of individuals in the voting booth. The original the-
ory regards the participation of partisans as a given and posits 
that short-term stimuli can alter the decisions of these citizens. 
Variability in the strength of short-term stimuli, the predictable 
directional bias of these stimuli in presidential years, and varia-
tion in the susceptibility of individuals to these stimuli lead to 
the following propositions: 
Hypothesis 5 (HS): Core voters will exhibit lower de-
fection rates than peripheral voters. 
Hypothesis 6 (H6): Defection rates will be higher for 
disadvantaged partisans than for advantaged partisans 
in presidential years. 
Hypothesis 7 (H7): Rates of defection will be higher 
in presidential years than in midterms. 
In contrast, the revised theory presumes that the primary ef-
fect of short-term stimuli on party identifiers is on their likeli-
hood to cast a ballot, not whom they mark on the ballot if they 
do show up to the polls. This implies: 
Hypothesis 8 (H8): Defection rates of core and pe-
ripheral voters will be approximately equal. 
Hypothesis 9 (H9): Defection rates of advantaged and 
disadvantaged partisans will be approximately equal 
in both presidential years and midterms. 
Hypothesis 10 (RIO): Defection rates will be ap-
proximately equal in presidential years and midterms. 
As with hypotheses 1 and 2, these hypotheses derived from 
each of the theories are diametrically opposed. As before, this is 
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illustrated by their side-by-side placement (5 and 8, 6 and 9, and 
7 and 10 respectively) in Table 1. 
Before continuing, I note two hypotheses regarding vote 
choice shared by the original and revised models: 
Hypothesis 11 (HI I) : The percentage of Independ-
ents voting for candidates of the president's party 
will be higher in presidential-years than in midterms. 
Hypothesis 12 (H12): The percentage of peripheral 
voters voting for candidates of the president's party 
will exceed that of core voters. 
The logic behind hypothesis 11 is straightforward: the short-
term stimuli that are important to the choices made by Independ-
ents are biased in favor of the winning presidential candidate's 
party. In contrast, the two theories arrive at hypothesis 12 from 
different directions. The original theory presumes that peripheral 
voters support the winning party largely due to the dispropor-
tionate representation of Independents and weak partisans in that 
group. The revised theory views disproportionate support of pe-
ripheral individuals as resulting from the effects of short-term 
stimuli on partisan turnout outlined in hypotheses 3A and 4A. 
Design 
Because theories of surge and decline are grounded in visions 
of individual change, the data (aggregate-level) and methods 
used in most analyses of midterm losses are of limited utility for 
present purposes. Instead, comparing surge and decline models is 
best accomplished using data that allow for examination of indi-
vidual behavior over consecutive elections. Consequently, like 
Scheve and Tomz (1999), I use the American National Election 
Studies' (NES) panel surveys of 1956-60, 1972-76, and 1992-
VOL. 30 2002 
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94.6 Methodologically, the analysis is not complicated. Each of 
the hypotheses outlined above specifies a personal trait (e.g. 
party affiliation) or type of behavior (e.g. defection) that is of 
interest. The traits or behaviors under examination can each be 
regarded as dichotomous variables. Two examples illustrate the 
point. In testing hypotheses I and 2, each observation (namely 
individuals casting a vote) falls into either the category of Inde-
pendent or non-Independent (i.e. partisan). Similarly, hypotheses 
5-10 require only a distinction between individuals who defect 
and those who do not. 
The dichotomous nature of our variables of interest allows us 
to regard each individual observation as an instance of either 
"success" or "failure." Consequently, each observation repre-
sents a Bernoulli trial with some underlying probability of suc-
cess.1 Of course, we are not comparing the outcomes of 
individual cases in testing our hypotheses. Rather, we are inter-
ested in the number, or, more precisely, the proportion, of suc-
cesses across repeated Bernoulli trials. For example, in 
hypotheses I and 2, we wish to compare the proportion of Inde-
pendents (instances of success) in the presidential and midterm 
electorates. As with all statistical hypothesis tests, however, we 
wish to test the population parameters, not the proportions ob-
served in our samples. Using our sample information, the appro-
priate statistical test is the z-test for comparison of two 
proportions derived from independent groups and the test statis-
tic is 
z = (Pl-P2)-(JZ"l-1Z"2)/ ,JP1(1-Pl)/ nl + P2(1-P2/ n2) 
6The surveys are conducted by the Center for Political Studies at the University of M ichi-
gan, and the data is organized and made available by the Inter-university Consortium for 
Political and Social Research . Neither of these organizations bears any responsibility for 
the analysis and conclusions found here . 
711 is also assumed that the observations are statistically independent, i.e. that the success 
or failure on any given trial does not affect the probability of success for any other trial. 
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where P 1 is the sample proportion for the first group, P2 is the 
sample proportion for the second group, 1tl is the population 
proportion for the first group, 1t2 is the population proportion for 
the second group, and n 1 and n2 are the sample sizes of the first 
and second groups respectively 1 
In looking at the test statistic, we note its sensitivity to both 
sample sizes and the distance of the sample proportions from 0.5. 
Differences of the same magnitude between proportions will be 
more likely to be statistically significant as sample sizes are in-
creased and/or as proportions approach the extremes of O and 1. 
Given this sensitivity, the present analysis emphasizes not only 
statistical significance, but also the directional consistency of 
findings. 
In addition to methodological procedures, two substantive as-
pects of this analysis deserve more detailed mention here. First is 
the issue of classifying individuals as core, peripheral, or non-
voters. Previous work has adopted one of two approaches in this 
regard. Some research, especially that not employing panel data, 
has used respondents' answers to the question regarding partici-
pation in previous presidential elections (e.g. Cove.r 1985). If 
individuals claim that they have voted in all or almost all 
("most") elections since they were old enough to do so they are 
regarded as core voters. Peripheral voters are individuals who 
claim to have voted in only some of the elections while nonvot-
ers are those who say they have never participated. The alterna-
tive method involves using behavior in successive elections as 
the defining criterion. Thus, individuals who respond that they 
have participated in both elections are classified as core voters. 
Given the lack of retrospective voting questions in most surveys, 
this method is more appropriate for panel studies and is the defi-
nition most commonly employed by Campbell (1966). This pa-
8Appendix B contains a more complete discussion of the exact tests performed . 
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per adopts the second technique, using responses to the follow-
ing survey item: "In talking to people about the elections, we 
often find that a lot of people weren't able to vote because they 
weren't registered or they were sick or they just didn't have time. 
How about you, did you vote in the elections this fa11?"9 Indi-
viduals answering "yes" in both years of the relevant panel qual-
ify as core voters, those affirming participation in only the 
presidential year are considered peripheral voters, while those 
answering "no" both times are nonvoters.' 0 
The second issue deserving more careful explanation is the 
treatment of party identification. At question is the proper meas-
ure of party identification. In his 1966 piece, Campbell employs 
a five-point scale that distinguishes between strong and weak 
partisans while grouping together "leaners" and "pure" Inde-
pendents." As subsequent research has illustrated, however, not 
9This wording is taken from the 1972 post-election survey. Some wording discrepancies 
between the years included in this study do exist, but there is no reason to suspect that 
these variations might lead to systematic differences in citizens' responses . Wording for 
the relevant item in other years, as well as descriptions of other variables, can be found in 
Appendix A. 
11
'This is obviously not the only possible classification scheme . For instance, peripheral 
voters might alternatively be conceived of as individuals who participated in one of the 
two election years, regardless of which . The approach used here is chosen in order to 
more clearly outline differences between habitual voters and citizens who are only moti-
vated to participate under high stimulus conditions . 
11The distinction between these types of Independents comes from responses to the fol-
low-up question in the party identification sequence of queries . For the order and text of 
these questions see Appendix A. Debate about the proper measure of party identification 
remains unresolved. Miller (1991 ), one of the founders of the Michigan school, has ar-
gued that there is a distinction to be made between party identification and partisanship . 
He maintains that the original intent of the party identification variable was only the long-
term affective attachment to a political party and that the appropriate measure is conse-
quently a three-point scale based on responses to the root question (again, see Appendix 
A for question text). In contrast, partisanship includes not only direction of party com-
mitment, but also its strength . While it is not my intention to take any position in this 
debate at the present time, most of the analysis here employs the three-point party identi-
fication measure. 
TH E JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
CAMPBELL V. CAMPBELL 19 
all Independents are equal. Instead, those Independents who re-
veal that they lean toward one of the two parties exhibit behavior 
that is often more partisan than that of weak identifiers of that 
party (Keith et al. 1992). Consequently, use of a five-point scale 
may obscure some important differences within the ranks of In-
dependents with regard to their voter status (i.e. core v. periph-
eral v. non) and their vote choice. In keeping with the initial 
examination of surge and decline, findings in the current study 
are presented with leaners included among the ranks of Inde-
pendents. Separate analyses were conducted in which distinc-
tions between types of Independents were made, but these were 
generally supportive of those reported here. 
The other point to be made about party identification is that it 
is not immutable. Literature regarding the endogenous nature of 
party identification dates back at least to Fiorina (1981) and it is 
now widely accepted that individual movement along the seven-
point scale over time is not uncommon. Consequently, in 
presenting behavioral patterns of partisans, a determination must 
be made regarding the appropriate temporal measurement of 
their identification. This paper adopts the convention of using 
citizens' initial response (i.e. that given in the presidential year). 
Findings 
The 1992-94 Election Cycle: Turnout. As is always the case 
with political surveys, the 1992-94 NES panel yields an inflated 
estimate of electoral participation. A full 62% of the respondents 
claimed to have voted in both elections while another 20% re-
ported voting only in the 1992 contests. Unfortunately, recent 
NES studies have not included a voter validation component. 
While we cannot be certain about the nature of overreporting, it 
seems unlikely that overreports are systematically biased in a 
fashion that would be of concern to the present study. We have 
no reason to suspect that either Independents or adherents of one 
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or the other political party would be more prone to exaggerate 
their behavior. 
Of those individuals casting a vote in 1992, 36% classified 
themselves as Independents. In the midterm contests two years 
later, this percentage remained unchanged. This finding clearly 
supports the revised theory's claim that short-term stimuli do not 
disproportionately encourage Independents to participate. Given 
this, we might expect the revised theory's hypotheses regarding 
TABLE 2 
Partisan Composition of 
Electorates and Voter Types, 1992-1994 
in percents (may not add to 100 due to rounding) 
1992 1994 Core Peripheral 









16 16 16 17 
18 17 17 18 
13 12 12 16 
8 8 7 13 
15 15 16 12 
16 16 16 15 
14 16 16 9 
100 100 100 100 
cross pressures to also fare well. Looking at Table 2, however, 
we see that the evidence is far from convincing. While Democ-
rats did compose a larger share of the 1992 voters, their percent-
age in that year exceeded their midterm share by only a single 
point. The two-percentage point rise in the Republican share 
from 1992 to 1994 still fails to meet conventional standards for 
statistical significance. 
As J. Campbell notes, differences in the composition of 
presidential and midterm electorates should be muted versions of 
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the differences that will exist in comparing core and peripheral 
voters. Consequently, an examination of the alternative hypothe-
ses regarding turnout may yield information that helps pass 
judgment on the relative merit of the competing theories. Return-
ing to the original theory's proposition that Independents should 
be more motivated by short-term forces and should therefore be 
better represented among peripheral voters than core voters, we 
are indeed confronted with more noticeable variations. As shown 
in Table 2, Independents compose a full 41 % of peripheral citi-
zens versus 35% of the core. While more eye-catching, this dif-
ference still does not attain statistical significance. However, 
looking at Table 2, we see that the 6% gap is driven entirely by 
pure Independents, and, for that group, a gap of this magnitude is 
significant. 12 
Turning to the revised theory's hypotheses about the relative 
presence of advantaged and disadvantaged partisans we again 
find mixed evidence. As expected, each category of Democrat 
identifiers is more represented among the peripheral voters while 
the Republicans all compose a larger share of core voters. Yet, 
the only difference that is statistically significant across the two 
types of voters is that of strong Republicans. 13 J. Campbell's hy-
pothesis regarding cross-pressures for disadvantaged partisans is 
borne out for this group. While it makes sense that more commit-
ted identifiers might be the most likely to experience discordance 
and withdraw from participation, a discussion of variation in 
cross-pressure effects is missing in J. Campbell's exposition. For 
strong partisans, the decision to cross party lines is probably 
more momentous than for their weaker counterparts. Further-
12This is an illustrative example of how statistical significance in the z-test for comparing 
proportions is a function of sample size and distance of the proportions from 0.5. 
13The fact that the only significant difference is for Republicans suggests there may be an 
asymmetric effect of the biased political stimuli on the turnout decisions of advantaged 
and disadvantaged partisans . 
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more, Perot's candidacy may have exacerbated this differential 
effect by presenting a fourth (in addition to voting for either one 
of the major party candidates or abstaining) alternative that was 
more appealing to weaker Republicans. 
The 1992-94 Election Cycle: Vote Choice.A look at behavior 
in voting booths may provide some additional insight into ques-
tions about intra- and inter-party variations and the role of a vi-
able third-party candidate. The first question to be answered 
concerns the relative loyalty of core and peripheral partisans to 
their party's candidate. The original theory posits that the weaker 
partisan binds among peripheral voters should lead them to de-
fect at higher rates (HS) while the revised version envisions little 
difference since the decision for most partisans is whether or not 
to vote at all, not for whom to vote. In Table 3, we see that the 
differences are in the direction predicted by HS." We notice once 
again, however, that Perot's presence complicates the analysis. 
When we consider only cases of "pure" defection (i.e. Democ-
rats voting for Bush and Republicans for Clinton), the peripheral 
rate exceeds that of the core voters by only 3 percentage points. 
But, if we include votes cast for Perot as defection, the difference 
jumps to a statistically significant 10 points. Peripheral partisans 
were more likely to vote for Perot than were their core counter-
parts (see Table 4). 
A glance at defection in the 1992 congressional races 
strengthens the case for HS. The magnitude of the core-
peripheral gap in those contests is 9 percentage points. It appears 
that the same forces leading individuals to vote against their 
party's presidential nominee were at work to steer them away 
from congressional candidates with the same label. While not 
"Note that Table 3 excludes !caners from the partisan ranks in calculating defection rates . 
If !caners are treated as identifiers, the differences between core and peripheral voters 
become more pronounced . 
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
CAMPBELL V. CAMPBELL 23 
exactly the prototypical coattails effect, this pattern does point to 
a meaningful relationship between choices made at the top of the 
ticket and those for lower offices . 
TABLE3 
Defection Rates of Various Voter Groups 
































































*Defection rates for the presidential contest in this column represent "pure" defec-
tion (Democrats voting for Bush and Republicans voting for Clinton). 
fDefection rates for the presidential contest in this column include votes for Perot 
by identifiers of either party as instances of defection . 
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with cross-pressures, the decision was made to show up to the 
poll and abandon their party's candidate. Meanwhile, the De-
mocratic defection increase points to the operation of coattails 
(even if not of overwhelming magnitude) in 1992. 
In addition to the competing propositions examined above, 
the two theories hold two common expectations. First, they both 
propose that the contextual bias favoring the winning presiden-
tial candidate's party will influence the vote choice of Independ-
ents, leading them to provide more support for that party in the 
presidential-year election than the following midterm (HI 1). The 
evidence here is clear. Whether we consider all Independents or 
just the pure variety, Table 4 reveals there is a significant de-
crease in the percentage of the vote given to Democratic con-
gressional candidates from 1992 to 1994. The second hypothesis 
common to the two theories (although, as discussed above, on 
the basis of differing rationales) is that peripheral voters will be 
more supportive of the president's party than will core voters 
(H 12). Once again, the conclusion reached depends at least 
partly on how we treat votes for Perot. 45% of both core and pe-
ripheral voters chose Clinton, but this figure represents 59% of 
the two-party vote of peripheral individuals and only 53% for 
core citizens. The 5-percentage point gap in the expected direc-
tion between votes for Democratic House candidates by the two 
types of voters lends additional credence to the proposition. 
Evidence From Earlier Studies : Turnout 
Both the presence of a strong third-party candidate and the 
sensitivity of the z-test for comparing proportions to sample 
sizes and the distance of the proportions from 0.5 makes the task 
of passing definitive judgment on the relative merit of the origi-
nal and revised theories more daunting. One way in which we 
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Having revealed differences in defection rates across types of 
voters, we turn our attention to partisan differences. Here, the 
original theory holds that the biased nature of short-term stimuli 
in presidential years leads to greater defection by disadvantaged 
partisans (H6) while J. Campbell again argues that the effects of 
the stimuli are manifest in turnout rates rather than vote choice 
(H9). As with the core v. peripheral distinction, the definition of 
defection employed has a bearing on the appropriate conclusion. 
Democrats and Republicans each leant 10% support to the presi-
dential candidate of the other party, but when votes for Perot are 
included, the Republicans defected at a 27% clip compared to 
the 17% mark for Democrats. Again, behavior in the congres-
sional elections lends greater credence to the original theory with 
the gap between advantaged and disadvantaged partisans being 
12 percentage points. 
The final point on which the two theories differ with regard to 
vote choice is their propositions about defection rates across suc-
cessive elections. The original theory suggests that the relatively 
low levels of stimuli at midterms will lead to diminished in-
stances of defection (H7) while the revised version once again 
posits that the tendency for disadvantaged partisans to abstain in 
presidential years leads to stable defection rates across elections 
(Hl 0). Comparison of defection rates across years requires the 
use of congressional elections, and in Table 3 we see that the rate 
for all participants in the respective years did drop by 5 percent-
age points. Even if we restrict the comparison to individuals who 
participated in both years (since we already know that peripheral 
voters are likely to defect more than core voters), there is a 3-
point decline. Most telling, however, are the rates for identifiers 
of the two parties. The Republicans had their rate cut almost in 
half while the Democrats actually edged up a couple percentage 
points. The former indicates that for many Republicans faced 
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can gain additional confidence in our conclusions is by examin-
ing the competing hypotheses across a number of data sets. Un-
fortunately, panel studies are quite expensive, and the NES series 
consequently includes only two additional panel surveys since its 
inception, one covering the years 1956-60 and the other spanning 
1972-76. 15 In looking at the data from these studies, we are espe-
TABLE4 
Electoral Support for Candidates of the Party Winning the 



































n = 413 
47 
47 Core Voters 
Peripheral Voters 
Independents 53 42 
Pure 51 43 
Democrat Leaners 75 68 
Republican Leaners 35 22 
•Figures for the presidential contest in this column represent absolute vote percent-
ages for Clinton . 
tFigures for the presidential contest in this column represent Clinton's share of the 
two-party vote. 
15While each of these panel surveys covers three elections, two presidential years and one 
midterm, the analysis here uses data from only the initial presidential-year contest and the 
subsequent midterm (i.e. 1956 and 1958, and 1972 and 1974). 
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cially concerned with the consistency of behavioral patterns 
across election cycles of different decades. Even if not always 
statistically significant, repeated findings supportive of one the-
ory over the other should be regarded as meaningful evidence 
upon which to draw conclusions. 
As was the case with the 1992-94 cycle, evidence from the 
earlier periods regarding turnout propositions generally favors 
the original theory. As shown in Table 5, Independents did com-
TABLE 5 
Partisan Composition of Electorates 
in percents (may not add to 100 due to rounding) 
Party 1956 1958 1972 
Identification (n=834) (n=681) (n=1216) 
Strong Democrat 22 22 15 
Weak Democrat 21 21 25 
Democrat Leaner 7 7 11 
Pure Independent 9 9 9 
Republican Leaner 9 8 12 
Weak Republican 16 15 15 
Strong Republican 16 18 14 











pose a larger share of the presidential-year electorate than the 
midterm in both the 1950s and 1970s panels. While these differ-
ences (1 percentage point in each case) fail to attain statistical 
significance, they are in the predicted direction. In contrast, the 
revised theory's expectations about the relative shares of party 
identifiers in subsequent electorates are clearly repudiated. In 
both cycles, the proportion of advantaged partisans (Republi-
cans) in the voting public increases as we move from the presi-
dential-year to the midterm. This directly contradicts H3. The 
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story for disadvantaged partisans is almost as unfavorable to the 
revised theory. fustead of witnessing a rise in their share of the 
electorate from the on to the off-year as suggested by H4, disad-
vantaged partisans retain the same shares in 195 8 and 197 4 as in 
1956 and 1972 respectively. 
Comparison of the turnout hypotheses in terms of core and 
peripheral distinctions also clearly favors the original theory. 
Table 6 reveals that the proportion of fudependents among pe-
ripheral voters was significantly larger than that among core vot-
TABLE6 
Partisan Composition of Voter Types 











































*Columns may not add to 100 due to rounding. 
ers in both of the earlier election cycles. fu addition to failing 
with respect to H2A, the revised theory runs into trouble with 
both H3A and H4A. The differences across voter classifications 
for advantaged partisans are in the opposite direction of those 
predicted by J. Campbell. fu both the 1956-58 and 1972-74 pan-
els, Republicans represent a larger share of core voters than pe-
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ripheral voters. 16 On the Democratic or disadvantaged partisan 
side of the ledger, the most notable finding is the relative lack of 
differences across core and peripheral percentages. In the earlier 
panel, Democrats maintain a two-percentage point edge among 
core voters, but in the later panel they represent a larger share of 
peripheral voters by a single percentage point. The revised the-
ory's proposition that cross-pressures should induce abstention 
by disadvantaged partisans is not supported. 
Evidence From Earlier Studies: Vote Choice 
As with the turnout hypotheses, the evidence from the panel 
surveys of the 1950s and 1970s generally tends to favor the vote 
choice propositions of the original theory over those of the re-
vised version. In both 1956 and 1972, peripheral individuals 
were more likely to cast a vote for the presidential candidate of 
the opposition party than were their core counterparts as seen in 
Table 7. Unlike the 1992-94 cycle, however, defection rates in 
congressional contests do not reinforce the support for HS over 
H8. Here, we note that in both 1956 and 1972, core voters actu-
ally abandoned candidates of their own party at a higher clip 
than peripheral voters by a single percentage point. The discrep-
ancy between evidence at the presidential and congressional lev-
els indicates a less than perfect relationship between choices 
made at each level. 
Disjunction between presidential and congressional voting 
patterns is further illustrated in examining propositions about 
potential variations between the defection rates of advantaged 
and disadvantaged partisans. In the presidential contests of both 
1956 and 1972, the defection rate of Republicans paled in com-
parison to that of Democrats (4% to 25% in 1956 and 5% to 44% 
16lf leaners are treated as partisans, the Republicans do compose a single percentage point 
higher proportion of peripheral voters than core voters in the 1956-58 cycle . 
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TABLE 7 
Defection Rates of Various Voter Groups 
in Presidential and Congressional Elections 
(in percents) 
1956 1958 1972 1974 
Presidential Election n = 619 n = 797 
All Voters 16 27 
Core Voters 15 26 
Peripheral Voters 21 30 
Democrats 25 44 
Strong 13 28 
Weak 37 53 
Republicans 4 5 
Strong 0 2 
Weak 8 7 
Congressional Elections n = 577 n = 493 n = 681 n = 574 
All Voters 9 14 18 18 
Core Voters 11 14 18 18 
Peripheral Voters 8 17 
Democrats 11 9 15 13 
Strong 5 4 8 5 
Weak 16 15 20 18 
Republicans 6 20 21 24 
Strong 4 7 18 20 
Weak 8 37 24 28 
in 1972), a finding in line with the original theory 's H6. Again , it 
seems that the bias of short-term stimuli does induce defection 
rather than abstention. While Democrats also defected more than 
Republ icans in the congressional elections of 1956, the differ-
ence was far less noteworthy at three percentage points . And , in 
1972, Republicans actually voted for Democratic congressional 
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candidates at a higher rate than Democrats voted for Republi-
cans, a difference in the opposite direction of that hypothesized 
by the original theory (although not supportive of the revised 
version's expectation of no differences either). 
Variations between choices made at the presidential and con-
gressional levels indicate that short-term stimuli that favor one of 
the presidential candidates do not necessarily provide much 
guidance for down-ballot contests. In other words, the effects of 
presidential coattails have some real limitations. Nevertheless, it 
would be misleading to completely disregard the role of national 
forces in congressional elections. A simple comparison of defec-
tion rates of identifiers of both parties across consecutive con-
gressional races illustrates the point. The presence of coattails is 
indicated by higher defection rates for disadvantaged partisans in 
the presidential-year than the subsequent midterm and lower 
rates for advantaged partisans in the initial election. With the 
exception of greater Republican defection in 197 4 than 1972 ( an 
occurrence which may be linked to the surfacing of the Water-
gate scandal), this pattern does indeed hold. 
Variation in defection rates across subsequent elections is also 
the topic of the final pair of competing hypotheses regarding 
vote choice. As with the 1992-94 data, we examine H7 and HlO 
by comparing defection rates for both all participants and just 
core voters in successive congressional contests. Unlike the most 
recent panel, however, the evidence from the earlier periods does 
not support the original theory. Defection rates in 1958 actually 
exceeded those of 1956 while rates in 1972 and 1974 were es-
sentially stable. 
Finally, we tum to the two hypotheses shared by the two 
theories. Table 8 shows that as with the 1992-94 cycle, the earlier 
two panels support the proposition that the independent vote will 
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more markedly lean toward the president 's party in presidential 
elections than in midterms (Hl I) . The levels of independent 
(both excluding and including partisan leaners) support for Re-
publican congressional candidates in 1958 and 1974 were lower 
than in 1956 and 1972 respectively . Once again, it appears that 
the presumed partisan bias in presidential-year political stimuli 
does exist and that it exerts considerable influence on the vote 
choice of those individuals with weak or nonexistent commit-
ments to a political party. 
Evidence for H12 is mixed . In 1956, support for both Eisen-
hower and Republican congressional candidates was higher 
among peripheral voters than core voters. However , in 1972 this 
pattern was reversed. Contrary to the expectations of both theo-
ries, peripheral support for the winning party actually lagged 
TABLE 8 
Electoral Support for Candidates of the Party Winning 
the Presidency by Various Voter Groups 
1956 1958 1972 1974 
Presidential Election n = 830 n = 1168 
All Voters 60 65 
Core Voters 59 67 
Peripheral Voters 65 61 
Independents 73 64 
Pure 87 69 
Democrat Leaners 27 36 
Republican Leaners 95 86 
Congressional Elections n = 772 n = 649 n = 991 n = 810 
All Voters 49 42 45 40 
Core Voters 49 42 45 40 
Peripheral Voters 51 43 
Independents 57 49 46 42 
Pure 59 54 42 30 
Democrat Leaners 19 17 21 22 
Reeublican Leaners 85 71 72 68 
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behind that of core individuals. This result can be traced to the 
large presence of Democrats among the ranks of the peripherals. 
This presence certainly runs against the revised theory's notion 
of cross-pressure leading to abstention. At the same time, the 
original theory's supposition that peripheral voters will be easily 
moved to vote for the winning party appears overstated. Democ-
rats whom turned out in 1972 but not 1974 were actually quite 
loyal to the party. 
DISCUSSION 
Perhaps more than anything else, the capture of both bodies 
of Congress by the Republicans in 1994 inspired the examination 
conducted here. The defeat of a number of congressional candi-
dates of the sitting president's party in the midterm elections 
once again proved to be of great political relevance. Of course, 
the 1994 midterm decline is just another instance of a well-
established political phenomenon. Yet, despite the fact that this 
phenomenon has been in place since the earliest days of modem 
American political science, explanations of its regularity remain 
incomplete. This paper returns to the original individual-level 
model proposed to account for midterm losses and evaluates it 
alongside a more recent revision of the model. Table 9 summa-
rizes the findings. 
In general, the findings of this study are more favorable to the 
surge and decline theory as formulated by Angus Campbell . This 
is especially true with regard to the competing versions' predic-
tions about voter turnout. The heightened levels of political 
stimuli associated with presidential contests do appear to dispro-
portionately encourage Independents rather than partisans to 
vote. Furthermore , the revised theory's claim that cross-pressures 
on identifiers of the party losing the presidency should depress 
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TABLE 9 
Evidence and Conclusions for 
Original and Revised Theories' Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 
(theory) 
HI ( original) 
v. 
H2 (revised) 







H5 ( original) 
V. 
H8 (revised) 
H6 ( original) 
V. 
H9 (revised) 
H7 ( original) 
V. 
HI O (revised) 




Subject Evidence and Conclusion 
Turnout 
Independent share of 
electorates 
Independent presence 
across voter types 
HI correctly predicts direction of dif-
ferences in all cycles, but most differ-
ences statistically insignificant. 
verdict: original theory 
HI A supported by all 3 panels. ver-
dict: original theory 
marginal support in 1992-94 , not sup-Turnout of advantaged ported in earlier cycles. verdict: not partisans 
supported 
Turnout of disadvan- support in 1992-94, but not earlier 
taged partisans cycles. verdict : not supported 
Vote Choice 
Defection rates of core 
and peripheral voters 
Defection rates of 
advantaged and disad -
vantaged partisans 




choice in on and off-
ears 
H5 supported in 1992 and in presiden-
tial contests of 1956 and 1972, but not 
congressional elections of earlier 
years. verdict: leaning original 
H6 supported in 1992 and 1956, evi-
dence mixed in 1972.verdict: original 
theory 
H7 supported in · 1992-94 cycle , HI 0 
supported in 1972-74, neither sup-
ported m 1956-58.verdict: neither 
theory supported 
evidence supportive in all 3 panels . 
verdict: hypothesis supported 
Vote choice ofperiph- generally supported in 1992, supported 
era I and core voters in 1956, not supported in 1972. verdict: 
uncertain 
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their relative turnout in those years receives little empirical 
validation. Partisan biases in political stimuli also do little to 
spur greater participation by adherents of the advantaged party. 
While the original theory also fares better with regard to 
propositions about defection rates, the story here is significantly 
more complex. The evidence is most clear on differences be-
tween advantaged and disadvantaged partisans. Given the failure 
of the revised theory's hypothesis about the role of cross-
pressures in reducing turnout for disadvantaged partisans , it is 
relatively unsurprising that these citizens do defect more than 
their advantaged counterparts. 
What is perhaps more surprising is the existence of mixed 
evidence regarding the question of core and peripheral defection 
rates. While peripheral voters do consistently abandon their 
party's presidential candidate more than core voters (as predicted 
by the original theory), there is no obvious pattern in congres-
sional contests. This finding points to leakages in the relationship 
between choices made at the top of the ticket and those made 
further down the ballot. Short-term stimuli have a pronounced 
and predictable influence on choices made at the presidential 
level, but their translation into voting in congressional elections 
is less clear. 
The uncertain effect of the heightened stimuli surrounding 
presidential campaigns on congressional voting is further illus-
trated by evidence concerning defection rates across successive 
elections. The original theory's supposition that a return to the 
"normal vote" in midterm elections will mean lower defection 
rates in those years does not meet with success. Neither, how-
ever, is the revised theory's proposition that defection rates will 
remain stable borne out. 
An examination of the individuals participating in the three 
panel surveys leads to the conclusion that national level forces 
do play an important role in the phenomenon of interest. Presi-
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dential contests have the effect of bringing a group of citizens to 
the polls that don't participate in other elections and, short-term 
forces influence the decisions of these individuals and those who 
vote on a regular basis. The combination of these two effects 
leads to greater support for congressional candidates of the party 
enjoying the advantage in short-term stimuli, support that is not 
present in the lower-stimulus atmosphere of the midterm elec-
tions. At the same time, one finding that has been repeatedly em-
phasized here is the gap between choices made at the presidential 
level and those made regarding candidates for the legislature. 
Although the existence of this gap does not necessarily mean that 
the coattail effect cannot completely account for the pattern of 
variation in the success of in-party and out-party candidates in 
successive congressional elections, it does mean that exclusive 
attention to national-level forces is unlikely to provide a robust 
model of vote choice in congressional elections. Any attempt to 
more accurately and completely explain which citizens are more 
likely to be influenced by their decision over presidential candi-
dates wiII have to incorporate other variables, including those 
reflecting local context. Of course, development of such a model 
is beyond the scope of the present analysis. 
APPENDIX A 
SOURCE AND DAT A DESCRIPTION 
As mentioned in the text, the data for this analysis come from three 
American National Election Studies (NES) panel surveys, those of 
1956-60, 1972-76, and 1992-94. The first two of these have been re-
leased by ICPSR as independent studies, the third is found in the 1994 
post-election study. The question wording and coding schemes of the 
items used from the surveys are as follows: 
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Turnout 
1956 (1972, 1974): "In talking to people about the election we (often) 
find that a lot of people weren't able to vote because they weren' t 
registered or they were sick or they just didn't have time. How 
about you, did you vote this time?" 
1958: "In talking to people about the election we find that a lot of them 
weren't able to vote because they weren't registered, they were 
sick, or something else came up at the last minute. Do you remem-
ber for sure whether or not you voted in the November election?" 
1992, 1994: "In talking to people about elections, we often find that a 
lot of people were not able to vote because they weren't registered, 
they were sick, or they just didn't have time. How about you, did 
you vote in the elections this November?" 
Coding: 1 if voted, 0 if did not. 
Vote choice, President 
1956: President: (if yes to turnout question) "Whom did you vote for 
for president?" 
1972: President: (if yes to turnout question) "Who did you vote for in 
the election for president?" 
1992: President: (if yes to turnout question) "Who did you vote for?" 
Coding (1992): 1 if voted Democratic, 2 if voted Republican (3 if voted 
Perot). 
Vote choice, House 
1956, 1958: "Did you vote for a candidate for Congress. (if yes) Who 
did you vote for? (if r does not know candidate's name) Which 
party was that?" 
1972: "How about the election for congressman- that is, for the House 
of Representatives in Washington? Which party's candidate did you 
vote for, for congressman?" 
1974: Congress: How about the vote for congressman. Did you vote for 
a candidate for Congress? (if yes) Who did you vote for? (if r 
doesn't know candidate's name) Which party was that?" 
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1992, 1994: "Here is a list of candidates for the major races in this dis-
trict. How about the election for the House of Representatives in 
Washington, did you vote for a candidate for the U.S. House of 
Representatives? (if yes) Who did you vote for?" 
Coding: 1 if voted Democratic, 2 if voted Republican . 
Party Identification/Partisanship 
"Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, 
a Democrat, an Independent, or what? (If Republican or Democrat) 
Would you call yourself a strong Republican/Democrat or a not 
very strong Republican/Democrat? (Independent, Other, or No 
Preference) Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or 
Democratic party?" Coding: 0 if strong Democrat, 1 if weak De-
mocrat, 2 if Independent-Democrat, 3 if Independent-neither, 4 if 
Independent-Republican, 5 if weak Republican, 6 if strong Republi-
can. 
APPENDIXB 
Z-TESTS FOR COMPARING PROPORTIONS 
As noted in the text, the statistical test employed in this analysis is the 
z-test for the comparison of two independent proportions . Here I de-
scribe the actual hypotheses tested and record the calculated z-scores . 
Asterisks indicate statistical significance in the direction expected by 
the alternate hypothesis at the following levels: 
* <.10 
j = <.05 
t = <.01 
Hypothesis 1 vs. Hypothesis 2: A one-tailed test with the revised the-
ory's expectation serving as the null hypothesis (HO) and the original 
theory's expectation as the alternate hypothesis (HI). 
Ho : 1tpr = nM 
H 1 : 1tpr > 1tM 
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where nPr is the proportion of Independents in the presidential-year 
electorate and nM is the proportion of Independents in the midterm 
electorate. 
1956-58: z = 0.45 
1972-74: z = 0.49 
1992-94: z = 0.00 
Hypothesis IA vs. Hypothesis 2A: A one-tailed test with the revised 
theory's expectation serving as the null hypothesis and the original the-
ory's expectation as the alternate hypothesis. 
HO: 1tP =nC 
Hl: nP > nC 
where nP is the proportion of Independents among peripheral voters 
and nC is the proportion of Independents among core voters. 
1956-58: z = l.72j 
1972-74: z = 2.19j 
1992-94: z = 1.30* 
Hypothesis 3: A one-tailed test in which the revised theory's expecta-
tion represents the alternate hypothesis. 
HO: 1tPr=1tM 
Hl: 1tPr>1tM 
where nPr is the proportion of advantaged partisans in the presidential-
year electorate and nM is the proportion of advantaged partisans in the 
midterm electorate. 
1956-58: z = -0.41 
1972-74: z = -1.00 
1992-94: z = 0.34 
Hypothesis 3A: A one-tailed test in which the revised theory's expec-
tation represents the alternate hypothesis. 
Ho: 1tP = 1tC 
Hl: 1tP > nC 
where nP is the proportion of advantaged partisans among peripheral 
voters and nC is the proportion of advantaged partisans among core 
voters. 
1956-58: ~ = -1.23 
1972-74: z = -2.79 
1992-94: z = 0.45 
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Hypothesis 4: A one-tailed test in which the revised theory 's expecta-
tion represents the alternate hypothesis. 
HO: 1tPr= 1tM 
HI: 1tPr<1tM 
where nPr is the proportion of disadvantaged partisans in the presiden-
tial-year electorate and nM is the proportion of disadvantaged partisans 
in the midterm electorate. 
1956-58: z = 0.00 
1972-74: z = 0.00 
1992-94: z = -0.35 
Hypothesis 4A: A one-tailed test in which the revised theory's expec-
tation represents the alternate hypothesis . 
HO: 1tP= 1tC 
HI: 1tP<1tC 
where 1tP is the proportion of disadvantaged partisans among peripheral 
voters and nC is the proportion of disadvantaged partisans among core 
voters. 
1956-58: z = -0.45 
1972-74: z = 0.31 
1992-94: z = -l.94j 
Hypothesis 5 v. Hypothesis 8: A one-tailed test with the revised the-
ory's expectation serving as the null hypothesis and the original the-
ory's expectation as the alternate hypothesis. 
HO: 1tP = 1tC 
HI : 1tP >1tC 
where 1tP is the proportion of peripheral voters defecting and nC is the 
proportion of core voters defecting . 
presidential election 
1956: z = 1.39* 
1972: z = 1.04 
1992 ("pure" defection): z = 0.70 
1992 (all defection): z = 1.81 j 
congressional elections 
1956: z = -0.95 
1972: z = -0.27 
1992: z = 1.40* 
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Hypothesis 6 v. Hypothesis 9: A one-tailed test with the revised the-
ory's expectation serving as the null hypothesis and the original the-
ory's expectation as the alternate hypothesis. 
HO: 1tD = rr.A 
Hl: 1tD > 1tA 
where 1tD is the proportion of disadvantaged partisans defecting and 7t 
A is the proportion of advantaged partisans defecting. 
presidential election 
1956: z = 8.07! 
1972: z = 14.971 
1992 ("pure" defection) : z = 0.00 
1992 (all defection): z = 2.34* 
congressional elections 
1956: z = .11 
1972: z = -1.27 
1992: z = 2.58! 
Hypothesis 7 vs. Hypothesis 10: A one-tailed test with the revised 
theory's expectation serving as the null hypothesis and the original 
theory's expectation as the alternate hypothesis. 
HO: rr.Pr=1tM 
Hl: 1tPr>rr.M 
where nPr is the proportion of voters defecting in presidential years and 
nM is the proportion of voters defecting in midterms . 
1956-58: z = -2.54 
1972-74: z = 0.00 
1992-94: z = 1.54* 
Hypothesis 11: A one-tailed test in which the expectation is repre-
sented by the alternate hypothesis. 
HO: 1tPr=rr.M 
Ht: 1tPr>rr.M 
where 1tPr is the proportion of Independents voting for candidates of 
the president's party in presidential years and 1tM is the proportion of 
Independents voting for candidates of the president's party in mid-
terms. 
1956-58: z = 1.48* 
1972-74: z = 0.93 
1992-94: z = l .97t 
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Hypothesis 12: A one-tailed test in which the expectation is repre-
sented by the alternate hypothesis . 
HO: 11:P =1tC 
HI: 11:P >1tC 
where 1tP is the proportion of peripheral voters voting for candidates of 
the president's party and 11:C is the proportion of core voters voting for 
candidates of the president's party . 
presidential election 
1956: z = 1.39* 
1972: z = -1.83 
1992 ("pure" vote%) : z = 0.00 
1992 (2-party vote%): z = 1.12 
congressional elections 
1956: z = 0.42 
1972: z = -0.52 
1992: z= 0.91 
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